This paper quantifies deviations from constant discounting and compares these deviations for health and money. Our measurements make no assumptions about utility and do not require that preferences are separable over time. In an experiment, most subjects were decreasingly impatient, but a substantial minority was increasingly impatient. The deviations from constant discounting were more pronounced for health than for money suggesting that time preferences are domain-specific. Hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) and proportional discounting (Mazur 1987) best described time preferences. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the most popular model to accommodate deviations from constant discounting, was rejected, for both health and money. JEL Classification: D91, I10.
Most personal and policy decisions involve outcomes that occur at different points in time.
Examples are the choice of a pension plan and the investments in a screening program that reduces future illness. To account for the different timing of outcomes, they are usually discounted at a constant rate.
Constant discounting is tractable and has normative appeal, but it is inconsistent with most observed behavior. Empirical evidence shows that discount rates typically decrease over time (Attema 2012 , Frederick et al. 2002 . Most evidence for decreasing impatience comes from studies using money outcomes, but it has also been observed for other domains such as health and environmental outcomes (Bleichrodt and Johannesson 2001 , Hardisty and Weber 2009 , Khwaja et al. 2007 , Cairns 2011, van der Pol and Cairns 2002) .
The violations of constant discounting are relevant for policy. From the work of Strotz (1955) , we know that a person who deviates from constant discounting may be prone to behave inconsistently over time and may have self-control problems, which lead to self-harming behaviors such as saving too little, addiction (Gruber and Köszegi 2001) and obesity (Ikeda et al. 2010 , Scharff 2009 ). These problems in turn may increase the welfare benefits from policy. For example, the net benefit of an increased tax on smoking may be much larger when the smoker does not discount at a constant rate, because this tax may serve as a commitment device that reduces the smoker's self-control problems and which he values (Gruber and Kőszegi 2004) .
To assess the severity of departure from constant impatience, and, hence, the vulnerability to self-control problems and the potential benefits from policy, the degree of decreasing impatience must be quantified. This is the aim of our paper. Prelec (2004) showed that decreasing impatience cannot be quantified by looking at the speed of decline of discount rates and, hence, the existing evidence on the rate of discounting cannot be used to quantify decreasing impatience. Instead, Prelec proposed to measure decreasing impatience by the Pratt-Arrow convexity of the logarithm of the discount function.
Unfortunately, this measure is hard to observe empirically. We will, therefore, use the method of Attema et al. (2010) , which is informationally equivalent to Prelec's measure, but can easily be applied empirically. An additional advantage of Attema et al.' s measure is that it makes no assumptions about utility or intertemporal separability. All existing estimations of discount rates imposed parametric assumptions on utility (most studies assume linear utility) and assumed intertemporal separability. These assumptions cause distortions in the measurement of time preferences (Andersen et al. 2008 , Broome 1991 , Loewenstein and Prelec 1993 .
In an experiment, we compared deviations from constant discounting for money and health, two domains where economic analyses are widely used and discounting is routinely applied.
Knowing whether time preferences are the same for health and money is important for both research and policy. Researchers often assume the same (constant) discounting of money and health and government offices try to set a single official discount rate to evaluate all public investments. If capital markets worked perfectly then this is the appropriate discounting policy (Moore and Viscusi 1990) . Health, however, is less transferable over time than money and there is no market for health to observe. In the presence of such market imperfections, it is unclear whether health and money should be discounted similarly. As noted by Moore and Viscusi (1990, p.52) , this question must be resolved empirically, which is what the current paper does.
Several papers have compared discount rates for health and money. As mentioned above, the results from these studies do not answer whether decreasing impatience differs between health and money, but they do shed some light on the question whether discounting for health and money are similar. The results are mixed (Attema 2012) . Moore and Viscusi (1990) and Cropper et al. (1994) found the same discounting for health and money, Cairns (1992) found more discounting for money and Cairns (1994) and Hardisty and Weber (2009) found more discounting for health gains and less for health losses. Moreover, the correlation between discounting for health and discounting for money was low (Chapman and Elstein 1995, Chapman 1996) .
The empirical deficiencies of constant discounting have led to new discount models. Of these new models, quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997, Phelps and Pollak 1968) is the most popular and it is widely used in economics today (DellaVigna 2009 , Diamond and Köszegi 2003 , Gruber and Köszegi 2001 . However, empirical evidence on the relative performance of these new discount models is thin on the ground, especially for health. This is unfortunate given the increasing use of these models in health (Fang and Wang conditionally accepted, Gruber and Kőszegi 2004 , Gruber and Köszegi 2001 , Newhouse 2006 ). An additional contribution of this paper is to shed light on the descriptive validity of discount models.
The results indicate that most subjects deviated from constant discounting and were decreasingly impatient for both money and health. However, around 25% of our subjects behaved according to increasing impatience, a finding that most discount models cannot explain. Subjects deviated more from constant discounting for health than for money. This domain-dependence of discounting suggests that evidence on time preferences for money has only limited validity for health. Of the alternatives for constant discounting that we explored, hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) and proportional discounting (Mazur 1987 ) described time preferences for health and money best. The widely-used quasi-hyperbolic discounting model could be rejected for both health and money.
Background
We consider a decision maker's preferences ≽ over timed outcomes , , denoting "receiving outcome at time ". Outcomes are health states or money amounts in our experiment. Time point 0 is the present. We denote strict preference by ≻, indifference by ∼, and reversed preferences by ≼ (weak reversed preference) and ≺ (strict reversed preference). Throughout the paper, we assume that the decision maker evaluates timed outcomes using discounted utility:
In Eq. 1 is a decreasing and positive discount function and is a real-valued utility function. Decreasing means that the decision maker is impatient and prefers to receive good outcomes sooner rather than later. We scale such that 0 1 and the utility of money such that 0 0. For health we will select a specific health state (chronic back pain) that we assign the value 0.
Constant impatience says that preferences between timed outcomes do not change if we delay them by a common constant: for all 0, , ~ , with 0 ≺ ≺ and implies , ~ , . Koopmans (1960) showed that constant impatience implies constant discounting: for 0 1. Decreasing impatience holds if adding a common delay makes people more willing to wait for the better outcome: for all 0, , ~ , with 0 ≺ ≺ and implies , ≼ , . Empirical studies have often found decreasing impatience, both for money (Frederick et al. 2002) and for health (Attema 2012) .
Increasing impatience is the opposite of decreasing impatience and means that adding a common delay makes people less willing to wait for a larger outcome: for all 0, , ~ , with 0 ≺ ≺ and implies , ≽ , . Several studies have found increasing impatience for money (e.g. Attema et al. 2010 , Loewenstein 1987 , Sayman and Öncüler 2009 , Scholten and Read 2006 , Takeuchi 2011 . For health, only indirect evidence of increasing impatience exists .
Let ≽ and ≽ be the preference relations over timed outcomes of persons and . We say that ≽ is more decreasingly impatient than ≽ if for all 0 , for all , and for all outcomes 
The parameter is a measure of decreasing impatience. If 0 then hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to constant discounting and the larger is the more the decision maker deviates from constant discounting. Two special cases of hyperbolic discounting are proportional discounting (Mazur 1987) , which results from Eq. 3 when and power discounting (Harvey 1986 ), which results when 1.
For money, Abdellaoui et al. (2010 Abdellaoui et al. ( , 2013 concluded that hyperbolic discounting performed better than constant, quasi-hyperbolic, proportional, and power discounting, even after correction for the difference in degrees of freedom. For health, van der Pol and Cairns (2002) found some evidence that hyperbolic discounting and power discounting fitted better than constant discounting and proportional discounting. Bleichrodt and Johannesson (2001) and Van der Pol and Cairns 2011) found that hyperbolic discounting fitted better than constant discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Time trade-off sequences
Because deviations from constant impatience are closely related to economic and health misbehaviors, it is of interest to measure these deviations. 1 Prelec (2004) argued that deviations from constant impatience can be measured using the Pratt-Arrow measure of the logarithm of the discount function: ln ′′ /ln ′. However, this measure is hard to observe. First, we must measure the discount function, which is complex because discounting and utility interact, then we must take the logarithm, and, finally, we must compute first and second derivatives. Attema et al. (2010) showed that deviations from constant impatience can be measured more easily using time trade-off sequences. To illustrate, we first choose two outcomes and with ≺ . A time trade-off sequence is a sequence of time points , , … , such that
We call , 1, … , , the decision maker's willingness to wait. Constant impatience implies that the willingness to wait is constant, decreasing impatience implies that the willingness to wait increases with , and increasing impatience implies that the willingness to wait decreases with . From Eq. 1 we obtain that
This is equivalent to:
Eq. (6) shows that a time trade-off sequence is equally spaced in terms of ln . This property does not depend on utility. Utility drops from Eqs. 5 and 6 and we do not have to make any assumptions about it.
We now define the time curve
1 Strictly speaking violations of constant impatience are not equivalent to time inconsistent behavior (reversals of preference over time) and self-control problems (Harvey 1995) . However, they are equivalent under the assumption of time invariance (Halevy forthcoming), which is commonly assumed in economics. .
It follows from Eq. (7) that 1, 0 , and 1 / . Because 1 / , the elements of the time trade-off sequence are not only equally spaced in terms of ln , but also in terms of . Under constant discounting is linear, under decreasing impatience it is convex, and under increasing impatience it is concave. Attema et al. (2010) showed that has the same degree of convexity as ln :
In other words, can be used instead of ln ) to measure decreasing impatience and person is more decreasingly impatient than person if 's time curve is more convex than 's time curve. The big advantage of using instead of ln is that is directly observable whereas ln is not.
The time curve can also be used to test the different discount models. Consider the following 
Experiment
Our experiment elicited time trade-off sequences for health and money. Subjects were seventy-five students (36 female) from Erasmus University Rotterdam, mainly from economics and business. Every subject received €12 for participation. The experiment was computer-run in 14 small group sessions. Subjects were seated in cubicles and could not see each other's screens.
The experiment consisted of two parts, the elicitation of the time trade-off sequences for health and for money. We randomized the order of these parts. Each part started with instructions and four comprehension questions (see the Appendix). After a subject had correctly answered all four comprehension questions, he answered two training questions. We told subjects that the training questions and the experimental questions had no right or wrong answers and that we were only interested in their preferences. We measured four time trade-off sequences for each subject, two for health and two for money. Table 1 shows the stimuli. All delays were in weeks. For both health and money, one sequence started immediately and the other in four weeks. We randomized which of these sequences came first.
For money we used €500 and €550 to elicit the time trade-off sequences. For health, we told subjects to imagine that they suffered from chronic back pain. Chronic back pain was described as:
 You have moderate problems in walking about.
 You have moderate problems performing your usual activities (e.g., work, study, housework, family or leisure activities).
 You have moderate pain or discomfort.
Subjects were told that there are two treatments (A and B) that bring relief of the symptoms. Table 2 shows the descriptions of the two treatments, which were displayed on the computer screen. They were also printed on cards, which subjects had on their desk during the To analyze the responses, assumptions must be imposed on the utility for time duration and most studies take this utility linear. By using two treatments with the same effect duration, we can avoid imposing restrictions on the utility for time duration. Sequences consisted of four elements ( 4). All indifferences were elicited using a series of choices. This procedure is common in experimental economics, because it leads to fewer inconsistencies than directly asking subjects for their indifference values (Bostic et al. 1990 ).
Subjects first made several pairwise choices. These choices limited the range within which their willingness to wait fell. Figure 1 gives an example of a pairwise choice. The upper bound for the delay in Option B was 500 weeks. If a subject still preferred B for a delay of 500 weeks, we also treated his response to this question as missing. Six subjects did this at least one. These subjects are the most patient. To test whether the exclusion of the most patient responses biased the results, we repeated the analyses at the individual level by also excluding the six most impatient subjects as a robustness check. The robustness check led to analogous conclusions as the main analysis and we will only report the single case where the results differed. The full analysis is available in the electronic companion to this paper.
Results
If a subject had some missing choices then these choices were removed from the aggregate analysis, but we kept the other, completed, choices. In the individual analyses, we needed all choices and the 12 subjects with missing data were removed. The individual analyses were therefore based on the responses of 63 subjects.
Consistency
For each subject we repeated two, randomly selected, elicitations, one for health and one for Decreasing impatience predicts that the WTW increases over the time trade-off sequence, which was largely confirmed. In the first health sequence (H1), the first and the second WTW were less than the third and the fourth WTW Wilcoxon test, all 0.01), but the first WTW did not differ from the second WTW and the third WTW did not differ from the fourth WTW. In the second health sequence (H2) all predictions were confirmed (Wilcoxon test, 0.02 in the The data are inconsistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which predicts that violations of constant discounting only occur when the present (time point 0) is involved and, hence, not in sequence H2. We could also test quasi-hyperbolic discounting by removing the first observation (the present) from sequence H1. Then all health outcomes occur in the future and quasihyperbolic discounting predicts constant impatience. This prediction could also be rejected (Friedman test, 0.01).
comparison between the first and the second WTW, all other 0.01) except that the third and the fourth WTW did not differ. The exponential coefficients were indeed larger for health than for money (LR-test, 0.01 . We could not reject the null that the coefficients were the same for the two health sequences (LR-test, 0.47), but for money the coefficient of sequence M2 exceeded that of sequence M1 (LR-test, 0.01) signaling a larger deviation from constant discounting in sequence M2. This finding, once again, contradicts quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Individual data
There was a lot of individual heterogeneity in the measured time curves. To illustrate, Figure 4 shows the time curves of four subjects for sequence H1. Subject 24 was clearly decreasingly impatient and Subject 10 was clearly increasingly impatient. The time curve of Subject 26 resembles quasi-hyperbolic discounting. His willingness to wait first increases, which is consistent with decreasing impatience, and then remains constant. Finally, Subject 60 is first decreasingly impatient and then becomes increasingly impatient.
Figure 4: Four different time curves
To quantify decreasing impatience, we computed for each subject a decreasing impatience impatience. 4 The NS index measures the absolute value of the difference between the area under the diagonal and the area under the normalized time curve. The larger this area the more a subject deviated from constant discounting. The analysis based on the DI and the NS indices usually gave analogous results and we only present the results based on the NS index when they differ from those based on the DI index. Table 3 shows that in both health sequences a small majority of the subjects were decreasingly impatient. Decreasing impatience appears a stable behavioral trait, as most of these subjects were decreasingly impatient in both sequences. Only 9 subjects switched from decreasing impatience in one sequence to increasing impatience in the other. In both sequences, around 25% of the subjects were increasingly impatient.
The values of differed across subjects and, ceteris paribus, larger values of lead to larger differences between the areas under the diagonal and under the time curve. The DI index is defined as: ∑ 4 . 4 The NS index is defined as: ∑ . Table 4 shows the results for the two money sequences. Decreasing impatience was also the most common pattern for both money sequences, but in each sequence more than 25% of the subjects were increasingly impatient. Impatience appeared to be less stable for money than for health, with 16 subjects shifting from decreasing impatience in one sequence to increasing impatience in the other. .05 , suggesting that time preferences for money were less stable than those for health. This is perhaps surprising as discount rates for money are more subject to market forces. The DI indices indicated more decreasing impatience for health than for money. However, this difference was only significant in the comparison with sequence M1. 5 On the other hand, the NS indices showed greater deviations from constant impatience for health than for money. 6 The deviations from zero of the DI and NS indices for sequences H2 and M2 provide further evidence against constant and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Hyperbolic factors
So far, the analysis has shown that our subjects violated constant and quasi-hyperbolic discounting for both health and money. To gain additional insight into the validity of the different discount models, we computed hyperbolic factors. Hyperbolic factors are undefined when their denominator is negative, which happens when a subject is extremely decreasingly impatient. Such behavior cannot be accommodated by any of the hyperbolic alternatives for constant discounting and requires more general discount models (Bleichrodt et al. 2009, Ebert and Prelec 2007) . It occurred rarely in our data. For each subject, we computed 24 hyperbolic factors, 6 per sequence. In all sequences, less than 10% of the hyperbolic factors had a negative denominator (5% in H1 and M1, 8% in H2 and M2).
We could not reject the null hypothesis of equal hyperbolic factors within each of the four sequences (Friedman test, all 0.09 . However, this result was sensitive to the exclusion of the 6 most impatient subjects: without these subjects we could reject the null hypothesis of equal hyperbolic factors in sequence H2 (but not in the other three sequences). While most median hyperbolic factors equaled zero, all sequences contained at least one hyperbolic factor that was significantly different from 0 at the 1% significance level. This confirms, once again, that constant discounting and quasi-hyperbolic discounting did not hold. Finally, we could reject the prediction of power discounting that the hyperbolic factors equal 1 (Wilcoxon test, all 0.01 . Consequently, the only models that are consistent with our data are Loewenstein and Prelec's (1992) hyperbolic discounting and Mazur's (1987) proportional discounting, except,perhaps, for sequence H2.
Discussion
The novelty of this paper is that we quantify deviations from constant discounting and assess their stability across two domains: health and money. This quantification gives new insights in subjects' vulnerability to self-harming behavior and whether this vulnerability is domain-specific. Our tests make no assumptions about utility and do not require intertemporal separability.
The main findings are as follows. First, our average subject deviated from constant discounting for health and money and impatience decreased over time. However, we observed much individual heterogeneity and a substantial minority of our subjects, between twenty-five and thirty-five percent, displayed increasing impatience. For money, our findings on increasing impatience confirm previous evidence (e.g. Attema et al. 2010 , Chesson and Viscusi 2003 , Loewenstein 1987 , Rubinstein 2003 , Sayman and Öncüler 2009 , Takeuchi 2011 . For health, only indirect evidence of increasing impatience existed.
The deviations from constant discounting were more pronounced for health than for money, which indicates first that people are more vulnerable to self-control problems for health than for money. This finding also suggests that intertemporal preferences are contextdependent and that findings for money outcomes cannot be simply transferred to health. We may have found less decreasing impatience for money due to market forces. As money is tradable on financial markets and transferable across time, people's discounting of money may have been disciplined by the prevailing interest rates for money (Cubitt and Read 2007) .
However, we also found that time preferences were less stable for money than for health, which seems to contradict the above conjecture.
Our final contribution is that we obtain new evidence on the descriptive validity of discount models. Such evidence is still scarce, particularly for health. Of the theories that we tested, hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992 ) and proportional discounting best described intertemporal preferences. However, it should be kept in mind that these two models cannot accommodate the behavior of the increasingly impatient subjects. The widely-used quasi hyperbolic discounting model was rejected, both for money and for health.
Appendix: Experimental instructions.
Welcome to this experiment!
Thank you for participating in today's experiment.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid in cash for your participation.
There are two parts in the experiment. You will be given instructions before each part.
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers, we are only interested in your personal opinion.
Please DO NOT talk with each other. If you have any question during the experiment, please raise your hand.
Please DO NOT leave this program.
Part 1: Instructions
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Back pain is a common health problem across all age groups.
In this part of the experiment we ask you to imagine that you have chronic back pain.
This means that:
· You have moderate problems in walking about.
· You have moderate problems performing your usual activities.
(e.g. work, study, housework, family or leisure activities) · You have moderate pain or discomfort.
You can find the description of chronic back pain on a card on your desk.
There is no treatment available that can completely cure you, but there are two treatments that give you a temporary relief of your symptoms.
Treatment A completely takes away the pain during one week. It does not improve your walking and usual activity problems.
Treatment B also completely takes away the pain during one week. In addition, it allows you to walk with only slight problems and to perform your usual activities with no problems.
You can find the descriptions of the effects of the two treatments on the cards on your desk.
The effects of the treatments start immediately at the beginning of the treatment and last for exactly one week. After this you return to your usual health state with chronic back pain.
You will be asked to make several choices between Treatment A and Treatment B. The questions differ in the starting time of the treatments. Usually Treatment B starts at a later date than Treatment A. There will be two types of screens. In the first screen you face a single choice between Treatment A and Treatment B. Figure 1 illustrates such a choice.
Figure 1
In this example, you are asked to choose between Treatment A which starts immediately and Treatment B which starts in 100 weeks. You will be asked to indicate your choice by clicking "A" or "B". Once you are satisfied with your choice, please click "confirm".
The second screen looks as follows: Figure 2 Here you are asked to make several choices, one for each row. For every row option A remains the same, while the starting time of Option B varies.
In the first row, you will choose option B, because it offers a larger improvement in health and both treatments start at the same time. As you move down the list, option B becomes less attractive because you have to wait longer before it starts. In some row, you will probably choose option A. If so, you will also choose option A in all rows below that one, because in these option B is less attractive. Similarly, if you choose option B in a given row, you will also choose option B in all rows above that one, because in these option B is more attractive.
The computer takes this into account and automatically selects option A for all rows below the one where you choose option A and option B for all rows above the one where you choose option B.
There are no right or wrong answers, we are only interested in your choices. You can change your choices as often as you like. Once you are satisfied with your choices, click the "confirm"
button. Then you can no longer change your choices.
To check whether you understand the procedure, please answer the following four questions:
Question 1
Which treatment is better if they both start today? By clicking "Back", you check the instructions on the previous page.
You will see the "Next" button when you have answered all questions correctly.
When you click "Next", you will get two training questions to become familiar with the questions asked in this part of the experiment.
Part 2: Instructions
In this part of the experiment, we ask you to imagine that you have two options.
Option A gives you €500.
Option B gives you €550.
You will be asked to make several choices between option A and option B. The questions differ in when you receive option A and B. Usually, you receive Option B at a later point in time than Option A. There will be two types of screens.
In the first type you face a single choice. Figure 1 gives an example. Figure 1 In the example, you are asked to choose between option A which pays €500 immediately and option B which pays €550 in 100 weeks. You will be asked to indicate your choice by clicking "A" or "B". Once you are satisfied with your choice, please click "confirm".
The second screen looks as follows: Figure 2 Here you are asked to make several choices, one for each row. For every row option A remains the same, while the time of payment varies in Option B.
In the first row, you will choose option B, because it offers more money and both options pay at the same time. As you move down the list, option B becomes less attractive because you have to wait longer to be paid. In some row, you will probably choose option A. If so, you will also choose option A in all rows below that one, because in these option B is less attractive. Similarly, if you choose option B in a given row, you will also choose option B in all rows above that one, because in these option B is more attractive.
There are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in your choices. You can change your choices as often as you like. Once you are satisfied with your choices, click the "confirm"
To check whether you understand the procedure, please answer the following three questions:
Question 1
Which option is better if they both pay today? "Gain €500 in 10 weeks" means:
o get weekly payment of €500 for 10 weeks o get €500 after ten weeks By clicking "Back", you check the instructions on the previous page.
